William & Mary Law Review
Volume 47 (2005-2006)
Issue 2

Article 7

November 2005

Appraising a Presumption: A Modern Look at the Doctrine of
Specific Performance in Real Estate Contracts
Jason S. Kirwan

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Part of the Contracts Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Repository Citation
Jason S. Kirwan, Appraising a Presumption: A Modern Look at the Doctrine of Specific
Performance in Real Estate Contracts, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 697 (2005),
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol47/iss2/7
Copyright c 2005 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr

APPRAISING A PRESUMPTION: A MODERN LOOK AT THE
DOCTRINE OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IN REAL ESTATE
CONTRACTS

INTRODUCTION

When two people agree to legally bind themselves to a contract,
and one of these parties subsequently violates that agreement, the
law has a difficult question to answer. It must determine whether
the breaching party should be forced to go through with the deal as
originally intended, or instead compensate the wronged party
monetarily. The established common law of contract remedies in
U.S. jurisdictions treats specific performance as discretionary.'
Thus, courts may, in special circumstances, force the breaching
party to go through with the bargain, but the default rule is cash
payment to put the aggrieved party in as good a position as she
would have been had the contract been completed.2 This preference
for cash payment, however, is reversed when the contract deals with
a parcel of land. A land transaction triggers an almost automatic
1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357 (1981) ("[S]pecific performance of a
contract duty will be granted in the discretion of the court....").
2. See id. § 347 (stating that "the injured party has a right to damages based on his
expectation interest"). There is some debate in the academic literature with respect to the
wisdom of this default rule. Some commentators have argued that specific performance
should, in fact, be the default measure of damages. See Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of
ContractRemedies-Efficiency, Equity, and the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111,
112 (1981); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 271 (1979);
Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance:Toward a Unified Theory of Contract
Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341, 343 (1984). But see Jeffrey Standen, The Fallacy of Full
Compensation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 145, 171 (1995) (arguing that, because specific performance
"governs behavior by coercion," it is "market diminishing" and courts should use it carefully);
Edward Yorio, In Defense of Money Damagesfor Breach of Contract,82 COLUM. L. REV. 1365,
1366 (1982) (contending that specific performance is both less efficient and less flexible than
a well-structured system of money damages). Much of the argument in favor of specific
performance is its superior protection of subjective value. See Linzer, supra, at 116-17;
Schwartz, supra,at 296-98. This intriguing debate, however, is not the primary concern of this
Note, which takes for granted that contract law's general reliance on purely objective
valuations is proper. See infra Part II.B.
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presumption that specific performance is appropriate.3 This
presumption, although longstanding and respected in the law,
stands on some rather shaky logical grounds.4
First, in some areas of the specific performance doctrine, the
application of the presumption is illogical and inconsistent. Based
on the unique properties of the land in question, it makes some
sense on historical and equitable principles that aggrieved buyers
should be able to demand specific performance of a real estate
contract. 5 In some jurisdictions, however, the law offers specific
relief to sellers as well, forcing the buyer to take the property and
give the seller a cash payment.6 Cash, of course, is the most fungible
property imaginable, and yet the magic of land's favored status
allows specific performance to produce it.
Second, the automatic availability of specific performance tends
to overcompensate parties harmed by the breach.7 This occurs
because once a breach materializes, the aggrieved party has an
option either to force completion at the contract price via specific
performance, or to seek compensation based on her expectations
when the deal was made.' Real estate markets have been known
to vary greatly over relatively short periods, and litigation over
contract disputes often takes many months. Plaintiffs, then, have
the luxury of observing the market for a period of time after the
contract has been finalized to decide which remedy to pursue. This
option confers upon a plaintiff a guarantee that she will be compensated at least in the full amount of her expectation, but it also
3. See, e.g., Miedema v. Wormhoudt, 123 N.E. 596, 596-97 (Ill. 1919) ("(Tlhe specific
performance of a contract to convey land is as much a matter of course as an action of
damages for its breach."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 cmt. e (1981)
("Contracts for the sale of land have traditionally been accorded a special place in the law of
specific performance.").
4. See generally Nancy Perkins Spyke, What's Land Got to Do with It?: Rhetoric and
Indeterminacyin Land'sFavoredLegal Status, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 387, 389 (2004) (arguing that
the law's special treatment of land owes more to societal conceptions of the meaning of land
ownership than to any intrinsic uniqueness inherent in real property).
5. See infra Part II.A-B.
6. See Lawrence V. Berkovich, Note, To Pay or to Convey?: A Theory of Remedies for
Breach of Real Estate Contracts,1995 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 319, 319-20 (1995).
7. See Jonathan Levy, Against Supercompensation:A Proposed Limitation on the Land
Buyer's Right to Elect Between Damages and Specific Performance as a Remedy for Breach of
Contract,35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 555, 555 (2004).
8. See id. at 559.
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creates a significant chance that she can improve her situation. 9
Overcompensation is a problem in contract law, which operates
most efficiently when the damages awarded match the actual harm
done.' °
Last, specific performance provides compensation that necessarily
includes a party's subjective valuations of property." Apart from
these transactions in land and a few other specialties such as
heirlooms, contract law does not take these idiosyncratic viewpoints
into account.' Wherever possible, valuations in contract law are
based upon objective market-driven observations to preserve
predictability and to allow for efficient breach. 3 A party seeking to
breach efficiently could still use some of her breach savings as a
payoff to prevent the other party from seeking specific enforcement, 4 but the increased transaction costs of this post-breach
negotiation will tend to make contract formation more costly and
inefficient.
The approach of general contract law, in which the party seeking
specific performance must establish why it is logically justified,
should be applied equally to contracts in land. Developments in the
field of professional real estate appraisal have made it possible to
ascertain accurately the market value of real property. For cases in
which appraisers' methods fail, doctrines already in place to govern
9. For example, assuming for the moment that the aggrieved party is a buyer, she will
seek specific performance if the market price of the property has either remained constant or
increased because she will get the property at its current, higher value while only paying the
price for which she originally contracted. If the value of the property falls in the interim,
however, she can choose to ignore her right to performance and sue for damages based on her
expectations as of the date of the breach. Thus, she can capture any appreciation in the
property's price, while passing the risk of depreciation to the seller. See id. at 560-61.
10. Specifically, overcompensatory damages deter potentially efficient breaches. See
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 119-21 (6th ed. Aspen 2003) (1973).
11. See Linzer, supra note 2, at 116-17.
12. See infra notes 42-55 and accompanying text.
13. See 11 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1004, at 42-43 (interim ed.
2002) ("Sentimental value is something that cannot be considered in the law of contracts....
In the process of determining values, market prices will always be used if such prices are
available."); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages,Penaltiesand the Just
Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient
Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 554, 573-74 & nn.53-54 (1977) (finding that the difficulty of
valuation and lack of foreseeability usually prevent courts from awarding damages based on
the parties' idiosyncratic valuations).
14. See POSNER, supra note 10, at 131.
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specific performance in general contract law can be utilized in favor
of the aggrieved party. In a world in which land ownership is often
seen as an investment in nearly fungible properties, in which real
estate appraisers have increasingly scientific techniques, and in
which judges have increased discretion in granting specific performance when the merits of the case actually require it, land's favored
status is an increasingly undesirable relic of the Middle Ages.
Part I of this Note summarizes the existing state of the doctrine
of specific performance, for nonland contracts and for real estate
contracts. Part II addresses the historical and logical reasons that
land is treated differently than other objects of contract actions,
concluding that the only relevant justification for this disparate
treatment that is consistent with the goals of modern contract law
is the idea that land tends to be difficult to value and replace. Part
III addresses this difficulty by surveying the predominant valuation
methods in the field of real estate appraisal, and concludes that
appraisal is sufficient for all cases that would not otherwise merit
specific relief on equitable grounds. Part IV addresses the concern
of increased judicial transaction costs.

I. CONTRACT LAW'S APPROACH TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
A. Nonland Contracts
A party who, following a breach by the promisor, seeks specific
performance of a nonland contract faces an uphill battle in
American courts. In these situations, the presumption in favor of
money damages can be overcome only if the court, in its equitable
capacity, deems that monetary reimbursement is inadequate.1" In
making this decision, courts examine the difficulty in accurately
calculating a party's expectation interest, 16 the problems, if any,
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1) (1981) ("Specific performance or an

injunction will not be ordered if damages would be adequate to protect the expectation
interest of the injured party.").
16. See, e.g., Oglebay Norton Co. v. Armco, Inc., 556 N.E.2d 515, 521 (Ohio 1990) (finding
the value of a long-term shipping contract in a market with widely fluctuating rates too
speculative to reasonably estimate expectation damages); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 360(a) (1981) (stating that one factor used in determining the adequacy of
money damages is "the difficulty of proving damages with reasonable certainty").
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that an aggrieved party may have in finding substitute performance, 17 and the likelihood that a cash award could not be
collected."8 Additionally, a court may choose to deny equitable relief
if such relief would require excessive court supervision.1 9 Other
grounds of judicial efficiency are occasionally considered in this
determination as well.2" Of course, as with any decision a court
makes in its equitable capacity, defenses addressing concerns of
fairness and justice, such as inadequate consideration, lack of
security for performance, and unilateral mistake, may be raised by
the party seeking to prevent specific performance.2
It is also important to note that the general trend in U.S. contract
law favors increased latitude for trial courts to grant specific
performance as a redress for breach.22 The drafters of the Second
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360(b) (1981). This factor is often redundant
with the difficulty in valuing a party's expectation interest. If substitute performance is
unavailable, it is usually the case that there are no reliable estimates of what that
performance would cost. Cases in which both factors are present tend to be decided on some
combination of the two. See, e.g., Triple-A Baseball Club Assocs. v. Ne. Baseball, Inc., 832 F.2d
214, 224 (1st Cir. 1987) (allowing specific relief in an action for breach of a contract for sale
of a baseball franchise because value was uncertain and because it would have been
impossible to find substitute performance).
18. See, e.g., Roberts v. Brewer, 371 S.W.2d 424, 425 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) (approving of
trial court's grant of specific performance on the ground that the promisor was insolvent and
could not pay money damages); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360(c)
(1981). Some jurisdictions, however, find this factor insufficient if not abetted by other
grounds for specific performance. 25 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 67:10 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 2002) [hereinafter WILLISTON]; see also Smith
v. Howell, 176 P. 805, 812 (Or. 1918) (noting that "insolvency alone is not a ground for
equitable relief'). A few courts even bar all consideration of insolvency in their decisions
regarding specific relief. See, e.g., Blank v. La Montagne-Chapman Co., 205 N.Y.S. 45, 46-47
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1924) (holding that insolvency may not be a basis for specific performance
under New York law).
19. See, e.g., N. Del. Indus. Dev. Corp. v. E.W. Bliss Co., 245 A.2d 431, 433 (Del. Ch. 1968)
(denying an injunction to order the hiring of additional workmen at a mill because such a
ruling would require the court to continually supervise the operation of the mill to ensure
compliance).
20. See, e.g., Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., 966 F.2d 273, 275-76 (7th Cir. 1992)
(ordering specific performance of a commercial lease to force the parties into private
negotiations on the theory that such negotiations would be less costly and more accurate than
a judicial determination of the amount of damages).
21. See Schwartz, supranote 2, at 273.
22. See, e.g., Cumbest v. Harris, 363 So. 2d 294, 297 (Miss. 1978) ('There is also
considerable authority, old and new, showing liberality in the granting of an equitable
remedy."); WILLISTON, supra note 18, § 67:1, at 186 ('There is generally seen a trend favoring
liberality in the granting of an equitable remedy such as specific performance.").

702

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:697

Restatement of Contracts, drawing on the comments to the Uniform
Commercial Code, incorporated this view in 1981 as an appropriate
description of the direction of contract law.23 Thus, even in nonland
contracts, judges have been increasingly likely during the past
several decades to grant specific relief in cases in which the
circumstances meet the rational justifications of such relief, despite
the fact that the presumption remains in favor of money damages.
B. Land Contracts
As mentioned above, plaintiffs suing for breach of a land contract
are almost always given the option of receiving specific performance.
In many jurisdictions, this is a flat rule.24 Other jurisdictions phrase
it as a presumption, but the result is usually the same.2" On rare
occasions, courts have given this presumption some teeth and
denied specific performance when the underlying justifications for
such enforcement were not present. 2' These insightful decisions
23. See U.C.C. § 2-716 cmt. 11 (1997) ('The purpose of UCC § 2-716 is to liberalize the
right to specific performance, and the trend has been to grant specific performance with
increasing liberality." (citations omitted)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, topic
3 introductory note, at 162 ("[Tjhere has been an increasing disposition to find that damages
are not adequate and the commentary to the Code reflects this 'more liberal attitude."').
24. See, e.g., Brown v. E. Van Winkle Gin & Mach. Works, 39 So. 243, 244-45 (Ala. 1904)
("The principle was early recognized and is now generally adopted that in contracts for the
sale of lands ... the remedy by suit at law for damages is not adequate .... ); Bharodia v.
Pledger, 11 S.W.3d 540, 544 (Ark. 2000) ("[W]e have allowed both the buyers and the sellers
of land to seek specific performance on real estate contracts throughout our case law ....");
Schumacher v. Ihrke, 469 N.W.2d 329, 335 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) ("If real property is involved,
specific performance is a proper remedy, even if other remedies would be adequate."); Ludwig
v. William K. Warren Found., 809 P.2d 660, 663 (Okla. 1991) ('Land is unique. Equity will
grant specific performance rather than substitute damages therefore.").
25. See, e.g., Friendship Manor, Inc. v. Greiman, 581 A.2d 893, 897 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1990) (citing a "virtual presumption" in favor of specific performance of land contracts);
Gleason v. Gleason, 582 N.E.2d 657, 661 (Ohio App. 1991) (holding that the plaintiff in a
breach suit is under no burden to establish the appropriateness of specific performance if the
contract deals primarily with land). See generally Spyke, supranote 4, at 393 (describing the
various terms used by courts).
26. See, e.g., Suchanv. Rutherford, 410 P.2d 434,438 (Idaho 1966) (holding that a contract
for "irrigated farm land common to the general area in which it is located" does not merit
specific performance because the land is not sufficiently unique or difficult to value); Paddock
v. Davenport, 12 S.E. 464, 464-65 (N.C. 1890) ('The true principle upon which specific
performance is decreed does not rest simply upon a mere arbitrary distinction as to different
species of property, but it is founded upon the inadequacy of the legal remedy by way of
pecuniary damages.").
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denying specific performance
have not, however, been widely
27
expanded.
or
followed
There is also some dispute regarding who may take advantage
of this presumption in favor of specific relief. It is fundamental
that aggrieved buyers may demand specific performance of land
contracts.28 Some courts have also held that the principle of
mutuality of remedies 29 requires that aggrieved sellers are afforded
the same presumption. ° Other courts, however, find this justification insufficient and will deny specific performance to sellers unless
other factors compel such relief.3 As previously mentioned, the idea
that some special characteristic of land gives a person selling it the
right to compel the buyer to take the land and pay the price is odd
indeed.
II. REASONS FOR THE SPECIAL TREATMENT OF REAL ESTATE
A. HistoricalJustifications
The special treatment of real estate in contract law has its
origins in the development of the English common law. In
premodern England, land was both an economic asset and the
primary indicator of a person's status.3 During that period, "the
contractual expectations of purchasers of real property consisted, in
27. See Spyke, supra note 4, at 397-98; Berkovich, supra note 6, at 319-20.
28. See, e.g., FriendshipManor, 581 A.2d at 897 ("[S]pecific performance is the buyer's
appropriate remedy .... "); Berkovich, supra note 6, at 319 (explaining that "buyers cannot be
adequately compensated with money damages").
29. The traditional principle is that, for contracts to be fair, any remedy available to one
party must also be available to the other. See WILLISTON, supra note 18, §§ 67:39-40 (noting
that, although the traditional view requiring mutuality has been largely discredited, modern
courts see a denial of a remedy to one party as insufficient to deny it to the other).
30. See, e.g., Bharodia v. Pledger, 11 S.W.2d 540, 544 (Ark. 2000).
31. See, e.g., Centex Homes Corp. v. Boag, 320 A.2d 194, 197-98 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1974) ("[Mutuality of remedy is not an appropriate basis for granting or denying specific
performance.... [S]pecific performance relief should no longer be automatically available to a
vendor of real estate, but should be confined to those special instances where ... equitable
considerations require that the relief be granted." (emphasis added)).
32. See David Cohen, The Relationship of ContractualRemedies to Politicaland Social
Status:A PreliminaryInquiry, 32 U. TORONTO L.J. 31, 39 (1982) ("[The discontinuity between
the legal treatment of land contracts and all others, may rest to a large degree on the political
attributes of land ownership-ownership which, for over four centuries, was inextricably
entwined with political power and identity.").

704

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:697

whole or in part, of political identity, political authority, a number
of legal privileges, and social status, which may or may not have
33
been transferred together with a valuable economic commodity."
Courts of law simply could not value expectations like "social
34
status" or the right to vote for a representative in Parliament.
Even if they could do so, substitute performance would have been
virtually impossible for an aggrieved buyer to find, as, at that time,
land was rarely bought and sold.35 It is thus eminently sensible that
the law developing at the time would treat contracts dealing with
transactions in land entirely differently than it would treat
contracts for the sale or exchange of chattels or services. Because
the courts of law were so ill-suited to consideration of issues
pertaining to land, litigants took the other route offered to them: the
courts of equity. 36 Equitable courts, of course, could address these
problems through the use of their power to grant injunctions or
performance when the plaintiff could get no satisfaction in the
courts of law. 7
B. Modern Justifications
Of course, the law/equity split in courts has been largely abolished in the United States.3 Although some would argue that there
remains a status element to land ownership,39 it is clearly no longer
a primary focus in the expectations of most buyers of real estate.4 °
Ancient roots alone cannot serve to justify the continuance of a
33. Id. at 54.
34. See id. at 55.
35. See id.
36. See 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 23, at 31-32

(Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1994).
37. See generally id. § 112 (enumerating the types of remedies traditionally available in
courts of equity).
38. See id. § 40 (listing jurisdictions in which the separation of law and equity tribunals
has been abolished).
39. See Spyke, supra note 4, at 394 (noting the social and emotional importance of home
ownership).
40. It could be argued that the ownership of certain real estate-penthouses on Fifth
Avenue, for example-is pursued primarily for status-based reasons. Such transactions,
however, are the exception rather than the rule and are really no different than the status
component in the conspicuous consumption of goods such as designer clothing or imported
luxury sedans.
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doctrine, so modern, valid justifications must be found if the
practice is to continue.4 1 Modern law continues to treat real property
differently for several reasons. As summarized by Loren Smith, a
former chief judge of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims,
[flirst, the law considers each parcel of land unique. Unlike
money, or most personal property, it is not fungible. Its location
can never be exactly duplicated, and each location has a unique
value. Second, the owner of land rarely has the same degree of
liquidity as the owner of personal property such as stocks, bonds,
gold, or the like.... Third, people have deep emotional attachments to land that they rarely have towards the other common
types of wealth. Fourth, a piece of land is part of a community,
always connected to ... the whole of civilized society.42
Putting the "uniqueness" explanation aside for a moment,43 many
of these other justifications are out of place in the specific sphere of
contract law.
Land as "part of a community," for example, can be dismissed.
Contract law operates most efficiently when it is uniform so that
parties do not have to incur additional costs in researching the law
in other jurisdictions where they may do business. 4 Communities
by definition are small areas, and thus any power to influence the
law of contract at the community level would make it increasingly
difficult for parties to engage in business over a wide area because
they would need to expend resources in investigating and complying
with the appropriate governing law in each district in which
they, or the entities with which they do business, operate. These
41. As Oliver Wendell Holmes famously noted,

[i]t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which
it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from
blind imitation of the past.
O.W. Holmes, The Pathof the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
42. Loren A. Smith, The Morality of Regulation, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & PoLY REV.
507, 518 (1998).
43. See infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
44. See Feng Chen, The New Era of Chinese ContractLaw: History, Development and a
ComparativeAnalysis, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 153, 168 (2001) ("When examining the contract
law systems of the world, it is clear that uniformity is the inherent requirement arising out
of a market economy.").
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increased costs would greatly discourage contract formation and
dramatically reduce the efficiency of the economy.45 Communities
certainly may treat land in a special fashion with regard to use
regulations and taxation, but the high costs involved make contract
law inappropriate for control by community interests.
Similarly, what Judge Smith calls "emotional attachment" can be
captured in the concept of subjective value. Any person who
continues to possess any piece of property inherently must subjectively value that property more highly than does the market as a
whole.4 6 The instant that the owner's subjective value drops below
the market value, the owner will be best served by selling the
property. This divergence between market value and subjective
value may be due to any number of reasons, including better
knowledge about the property's quality, a personal insight that its
value will rise or fall in the future, or some emotional attachment.
The law, however, is inconsistent in deciding whether this
subjective value is relevant in valuing property interests. A general
theme of contract law is the rejection of moral concerns in favor of
determinable economic realities.4 7 As an example, punitive damages
are not allowed in contract actions unless a related tort claim is
attached.4" If contract law truly took subjective value into account,
specific performance would be justified in every situation, due to the
incredible difficulty in determining the prices that individual
owners place on their possessions.4 9 It is for this reason that the law
45. Indeed, some commentators go further to state that the existing state-based common
law system is a poor vehicle for contract law due to its lack of national uniformity. See, e.g.,
Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Stop Mucking Up Copyright Law: A Proposal for a Federal
Common Law of Contract,35 RUTGERS L.J. 959, 963 (2004) (arguing that the goal of a uniform
copyright law is undercut by individual state court decisions based on the common law of
contracts).
46. Or at least more highly than its market price, minus any transaction costs that would
be incurred in selling it.
47. Holmes was a major proponent of this theme in American law. He wrote that
"[n]owhere is the confusion between legal and moral ideas more manifest than in the law of
contract.... The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay
damages if you do not keep it,-and nothing else." Holmes, supra note 41, at 462. But see
Linzer, supra note 2, at 117 ("Any economic analysis that assigns no value to [subjective
interests of property owners] is incapable of measuring the true costs and benefits of
breach.").
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981).
49. See supra note 2. Some commentators have used this very argument to advocate
specific performance as the default remedy in all contract actions. See Linzer, supra note 2,
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governing compensation for property taken by government action,5"

which, in practice, deals most commonly with real property, ignores
subjective value entirely.51
There are, however, commonly cited exceptions when subjective
value is an important concern for courts. The most prominent
examples are specific performance cases involving family heirlooms
or other highly sentimental items.5 Even if a piece of property is not
physically unique,53 courts will sometimes grant specific relief due
to the emotional involvement of the plaintiff.54 Thus, subjective
value is an appropriate consideration in contract law if a case falls
into the exception carved out for plaintiffs with a deep emotional
attachment to a piece of property.55 It is probably true, as Judge
Smith notes, that this emotional attachment develops more often
with land than with chattels, but it cannot be the case that such a

at 116-17.
50. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
51. See Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) ("Just compensation [for
government takings] includes all elements of value that inhere in the property, but it does not
exceed market value fairly determined." (emphasis added)); cf. Head v. AmoskeagMfg. Co., 113
U.S. 9, 12 (1885) (quoting a New Hampshire statute that authorized compensation for takings
by mill owners at market value plus fifty percent); ERIC C.E. TODD, THE LAW OF
EXPROPRIATIONAND COMPENSATION IN CANADA 116-18 (1976) (describing the Canadian system
of repayment for government takings, which includes market value plus "disturbance costs"
incurred in vacating, interest, and any "special value" that the owner has in the property not
captured by market determination).
52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 cmt. b (1981). ("Some types of
interests are by their very nature incapable of being valued in money. Typical examples
include heirlooms, family treasures and works of art that induce a strong sentimental
attachment.").
53. Uniqueness, of course, would justify specific performance in its own right. See supra

note 17 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., Burr v. Bloomsburg, 138 A. 876, 881 (N.J. Ch. 1927) (ordering specific relief
of a diamond ring that, to the plaintiff, "is endowed with a sentimental fancy, which, even
though imaginary, can no more be estimated in dollars and cents than can mother love or the
guileless and trusting affection of the child").
55. Most property of emotional importance may also be deserving of specific performance
because it is physically unique and substitutes cannot be purchased. Subjective value is only
considered in that small category of cases in which the court recognizes that the replaceable
property bears such emotional significance that the expectations of the plaintiff are based on
the associated emotion rather than the economic significance of ownership. See, e.g., id.
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correlation by itself can justify a flat presumption for all land
contracts.56
The most commonly cited reason for the special treatment of real
property, however, is the simple statement that "land is unique. 57
Fundamentally, this is quite accurate. No one parcel of land is
exactly like any other. But granting specific relief simply based
upon uniqueness proves too much. The law does not presume that
specific performance is required in any contract involving particular
heads of livestock, which are, of course, equally unique.5" There is
something else below the surface. As one might infer from reading
the Second Restatement, 59 a breach of a contract involving unique
property is grounds for specific relief for two closely related reasons:
there is no possibility of adequate replacement on the open market,
and the determination of expectation damages is too uncertain.6 °
The possibility of replacing a piece of real property depends
entirely on its type and location. In many instances, the presumption in favor of specific relief will seem completely justified on these
grounds. But, there are legions of other situations in which an
interest in real estate could be easily replaced on the open market.
Stable markets exist in many areas for farmland, vacant lots,
single-family homes, condominiums, commercial office space, and
many other common forms of real property. 1 For these property
56. If it were true that any type of property with which people are anecdotally more likely
to develop deep emotional attachments should be given a presumption in favor of specific
performance, property such as diamond rings, baby clothes, and household pets have an
arguably stronger claim to the presumption than does real estate.
57. See Spyke, supranote 4, at 387 ("For centuries courts have told us that land is unique.
Hundreds of judicial opinions rely on this principle.").
58. See, e.g., Frensley v. Mills, 746 S.W.2d 427,428 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (granting damages
for breach of a contract for the sale of cattle, without considering the possibility of specific
performance).
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 360(a)-(b) (1981).
60. In essence, the "uniqueness" phraseology serves as a proxy for both the availability
of substitute performance and the certainty of damages. See supra Part I.A.; see also Spyke,
supra note 4, at 394 ("[T]he impossibility of acquiring a duplicate parcel of land and
difficulties in valuing the land are the reasons that courts presume [money damages to be
inadequate].").
61. See, e.g., Suchan v. Rutherford, 410 P.2d 434, 438 (Idaho 1966) (finding a strong
market for farmland in rural Idaho); Jill Andresky Fraser, Where Investors Would Rather Be,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Oct. 2002, at 133, 133-34 (discussing the market for commercial
office space in Philadelphia); Dennis Hevesi, Not Even TerrorAttack DimsManhattanMarket,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2002, at B2 (discussing the market for residential living space in
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interests, the difficulty in finding a replacement cannot carry the
presumption. Therefore, the methods that courts and professionals
use to value real estate warrant some serious investigation.

III. REAL ESTATE APPRAISAL AND THE PROBLEMS IN VALUING
ESTATES IN LAND
A. Appraisals in the Law
In most cases, if a party needs to establish the value of a piece of
real property before a court, a professional real estate appraiser is
used. Appraisers are admitted as expert witnesses under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 2 and have professional organizations,"s
both governmental 4 and private65 certifications, and government-

Manhattan).
62. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (governing the admissibility of testimony by expert witnesses).
For a discussion of how individual states allow the admission of expert testimony, see
generally Robert McGrath & Paula R. Moore, Taller and Better Looking Judges in Texas, 3
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 367, 369-78 (1997).
63. The Appraisal Foundation is a private, nonprofit umbrella organization encompassing
the major North American associations of professional appraisers. Apprasial Found.,
Foundation FAQs, http://www.appraisalfoundation.org/s~appraisalldoc.asp?CID=69&DID
=172 (last visited Oct. 12, 2005). Specifically for real estate appraisers, the recognized leader
is the 18,000-member Appraisal Institute. See Sofia Adrogud & Alan Ratliff, Kicking the Tires
After Kumho: The Bottom Line on Admitting FinancialExpert Testimony, 37 Hous. L. REV.
431, 504 (2000); Appraisal Inst., Who We Are, http://www.appraisalinstitute.org/about/
default.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 2005).
64. States have licensing and certification programs that conform to nationally approved
standards. See J.D. EATON, REAL ESTATE VALUATION IN LITIGATION 531 & n.2 (2d ed. 1995).
Federal law assigns the job of promulgating these standards to the Appraisal Foundation. See

12 U.S.C.A. § 3345(b) (West Supp. 2001) ("No individual shall be a State certified real estate
appraiser... unless such individual has achieved a passing grade upon a suitable examination
... that is consistent with and equivalent to the Uniform State Certification Examination
issued or endorsed by the Appraiser Qualification Board of the Appraisal Foundation.");
Apprasial Found., supra note 63.
65. The Appraisal Institute offers the most widely recognized appraiser certifications,
which generally complement the state certification requirements. See Adrogu6 & Ratliff,
supra note 63, at 504; Appraisal Inst., About Our Designations, http://www.appraisal
institute.org/about/designations.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 2005).
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ally regulated standards of practice6 6 to buttress their testimony as
sufficiently scientific. 7
Moreover, the law often requires that professional appraisers
value properties before courts. Consider that, although contract law
assumes that it is impossible to determine a property's true value,
the law regarding eminent domain compensation requiresa judicial
determination of fair market value whenever a property owner
challenges a governmental taking. 6 Similarly, local ad valorem
property taxes rely on appraisal methods to determine the taxes
paid by landowners. 69 Courts also frequently use appraisal testimony in cases involving business valuations," divorces,71 foreclosures, 72 and estates.773

66. Improving appraisal standards was a major focus of the reforms passed following the
savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s. See Adrogu6 & Ratliff, supra note 63, at 503; Alison
K. Bailey Seas, Evolution of Appraisal Reform and Regulation in the United States, 62
APPRAISAL J. 26, 33-35 (1994). Congress, as part of the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183, bound federal
agencies to the appraisal standards promulgated by the Appraisal Foundation. Id.§ 1110
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3339 (2000)) (requiring agencies to "prescribe appropriate standards
for the performance of real estate appraisals .... These rules shall require, at a minimum...
generally accepted appraisal standards as evidenced by the appraisal standards promulgated
by the Appraisal Standards Board of the Appraisal Foundation"); see also APPRAISAL
FOUNDATION, UNIFORM STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL APPRAISAL PRACTICE (2005), available
at http://commerce.appraisalfoundation.org/html/USPAP2005/toc.htm (last visited Oct. 12,
2005).
67. See Adrogu6 & Ratliff, supra note 63, at 503-13 (analyzing the factors courts should
weigh in admitting expert testimony by appraisers); Richard W. Hoyt & Robert J. Aalberts,
Implications of the Kumho Tire Case for AppraisalExpert Witnesses, 69 APPRAISAL J. 11, 1718 (2001) (concluding that appraisers must be careful to adhere to established and generally
accepted appraisal practices, or risk their testimony being excluded); see also FED. R. EVID.
702 (governing the admissibility of testimony by expert witnesses); Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149-50 (1999) (holding that technical evidence offered by expert
witnesses must have "a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of [the relevant]
discipline") (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
68. See Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934); supra note 51.
69. See, e.g., Bailey County Appraisal Dist. v. Smallwood, 848 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex. App.
1993).
70. See, e.g., McCormick v. Brevig, 96 P.3d 697, 702 (Mont. 2004) (valuing a partnership's
real estate holdings).
71. See, e.g., Watters v. Watters, 959 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
72. See, e.g., Allied Steel Corp. v. Cooper, 607 So.2d 113, 119-20 (Miss. 1992).
73. See, e.g., In re Estate of Jones, 93 P.3d 147, 153 (Wash. 2004).
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B. Criticismsof Appraisals in Court
Courts, however, have been critical of real estate appraisal in the
4 a
past. The Supreme Court stated in United States v. Miller,"
Takings Clause case decided in 1943, that the determination of
market value for a property with no recent sales in the surrounding
area amounts to "at best, a guess by informed persons."75 At the
time, that point was probably true, but appraisal has grown
dramatically as a profession since that decision was handed down.76
One measure of this growth is that, in recent decades, several
prominent colleges and universities have initiated real estate
programs that include instruction in appraisal techniques.7 7
More recent critics, such as Professor John Shampton, focus on
the subjective elements of professional real estate appraisal.7"
Subjective factors, Shampton argues, tend to lead a case into a
wasteful "battle of the experts."'7 9 He contends that objective
statistical valuation should eventually replace professional
appraisers as a court's main tool in establishing property values.8 '
There are two key weaknesses to his argument. First, Shampton
ignores the fact that many real estate appraisers already incorporate statistical modeling into their analysis when it is appropriate.8 '
In doing so, he compares past appraisal practices with the potential
of statistical models that are not yet fully formed. 2 Second,
statistical evidence is not so authoritative that it would preclude a

74. 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
75. Id. at 375.
76. See Norman G. Miller & Sergey Markosyan, The Academic Roots and Evolution of
Real Estate Appraisal, 71 APPRAISAL J. 172, 173 (2003) (finding that, prior to the 1950s,
appraisal methods were limited to "fairly simple calculations," but have become dramatically
more sophisticated since that time); Seas, supra note 66, at 27-28 (same).
77. See Miller & Markosyan, supra note 76, at 181-82.
78. See John F. Shampton, Statistical Evidence of Real Estate Valuation: Establishing
Value Without Appraisers, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 113, 115 (1996) ("Appraisals are ultimately
products of opinion rather than pure calculation.").
79. See id.
80. Id. at 147-48.
81. See, e.g., Max Kummerow, A StatisticalDefinition of Value, 70 APPRAISAL J. 407, 408
(2002) (encouraging appraisers to supplement their value estimates with statistical confidence
intervals).
82. Shampton, supra note 78, at 148.
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battle between opposing statisticians. 3 Shampton's approach would
likely replace a battle of expert appraisers with a battle of expert
statisticians who use competing valuation models.
C. Appraisal Techniques
Commonly accepted appraisal practice typically involves three
valuation approaches." The appraiser uses every approach that is
suitable for the type of property being valued.85 She then reconciles
the estimates of the different approaches into a final value. 6
Regardless of the approach or approaches used, however, the first
step is always to determine the property's "highest and best use,"
which is defined as "[t]he reasonably probable and legal use of
vacant land or an improved property that is physically possible,
appropriately supported, and financially feasible and that results in
the highest value." 7 Thus, all appraisal approaches operate under
the theory that the market value of a parcel of land will reflect the
most economically productive use of that land. This viewpoint is
consistent with contract law's focus on economically determinable
values and its rejection of subjective valuation.8

83. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 (1977)
("[S]tatistics are not irrefutable, they come in infinite variety and, like any other kind of
evidence, they may be rebutted.").
84. But see McCloud B. Hodges, Jr., Three Approaches?, 61 APPRAISAL J. 553, 553-54
(1993) (arguing that judicial and legislative action have hindered the development of real
estate appraisal by institutionalizing the three main approaches and discouraging
innovation).
85. See EATON, supra note 64, at 160-61 ("The appraiser who does not use all applicable
approaches to value has simply not made an analysis that is thorough enough for trial
purposes.").
86. See APPRAISAL INSTITUTE, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE 597 (12th ed. 2001). This
reconciliation is done by evaluating the factors that may have made the application of the
various approaches used more or less accurate and weighing their results accordingly. For a
list of factors typically considered in this process, see id. at 598.
87. Id. at 305. For a summary of the techniques that appraisers use to determine highest
and best use, see id. at 305-27.
88. See supra notes 13, 46-56 and accompanying text.
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1. Sales ComparisonAnalysis
The first major method of real estate appraisal is the sales
comparison analysis. Quite simply, this approach surveys sales of
similar properties in the surrounding area, adjusts their prices for
differences between the sale and the subject, and integrates the
data into a final estimate. 9 'The sales comparison approach usually
provides the primary indication of market value in appraisals of
properties that are not usually purchased for their income-producing characteristics."9 Furthermore, this approach is quite flexible
and can be applied to all types of property, as long as there are a
sufficient number of recent transactions involving similar properties
in the relevant real estate market. 91
For most types of properties, sales comparison is the dominant
approach to value whenever it is feasible, and courts often prefer it
over other appraisal methods.9 The primary weakness of this
method is that it fails when the appraiser cannot find a sufficient
number of adequately comparable sales. 93 A secondary flaw is that,
for properties sought chiefly as income-producing investments,
comparisons with other pieces of land are far more difficult to make
because obtaining information concerning the economic variables in
which a buyer is most interested can be difficult.9 4

89. See APPRAISAL INSTITUTE, supra note 86, at 417. For examples and a summary of the
analytical techniques involved in sales comparison, see id. at 429-68.
90. Id. at 419.
91. See id.
92. See EATON, supra note 64, at 223 ('The sales comparison approach is widely accepted
by the courts, at times to the exclusion of any other approach to value."); see also United
States v. 47.14 Acres of Land, 674 F.2d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 1982) (rejecting the trial court's
reliance on income capitalization when comparable sales data was the "best evidence" of
value); Correia v. New Bedford Redev. Auth., 377 N.E.2d 909, 911 (Mass. 1978) (expressing
the court's preference for the determination of value by either comparable sales or income
capitalization before resorting to a replacement cost analysis).
93. See APPRAISAL INSTITUTE, supra note 86, at 419.
94. See id. at 420 ("Thoroughly analyzing comparable sales of large, complex, incomeproducing properties is difficult because information on the economic factors influencing the
decisions of buyers is not readily available from public records or interviews with buyers and
sellers.").
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2. Income CapitalizationAnalysis
An approach to valuation based on income capitalization is of
primary importance for commercial and industrial properties. This
approach analyzes the potential future net income of the property"
and uses asset capitalization techniques to derive present value. 96
Of course, this approach is limited to properties that "generate
income.'
The key weakness of the income approach is that it
requires the estimation of future income and costs, which are
usually highly dependant on external market conditions.9" It is
important to note, however, that the appraiser need not actually
forecast the direction of financial markets, but must instead
ascertain what investors currently predict these markets will do in
the future, as these expectations determine what a willing buyer
would pay on the current market. 99
Courts tend to view income capitalization evidence with less trust
than they view sales comparisons." ° It is true, however, that "[i]n
all jurisdictions the courts appear to accept evidence developed
through the income capitalization approach when the property in
question is income-producing and sufficient market data to develop
the sales comparison approach are not available."'O' Even in cases
in which comparable sales are available, it is considered good
appraisal practice to also use an income analysis to double-check
and confirm the sales comparison conclusions. °2 The income
approach is far more mathematically complex than the other two
approaches, however, and courts may limit its admissibility to

95. These determinations are, in essence, analogous to the sales comparison approach,
because the appraiser must derive the rental rates and operating expenses the property will
command via comparisons with similar, commercially rented properties. Id. at 499-502
(discussing market rental rates and income and expense data). For general methods
appraisers use to predict future incomes and expenses, see id. at 497-528.
96. For capitalization techniques used by appraisers, see id. at 529-93.
97. See id. at 472.
98. See id. at 491.
99. See id.
100. See, e.g., United States v. 47.14 Acres of Land, 674 F.2d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 1982)
(rejecting the trial court's reliance on income capitalization when comparable sales data was
the "best evidence" of value).
101. EATON, supra note 64, at 174.
102. See supra note 85.
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avoid confusion or waste of time when better data, such as sales
comparisons, are also available. °3
3. Cost Analysis
The final major approach, cost analysis, attempts to determine
how much it would cost to physically replace the existing property.
This is done by separately valuing the land0 4 plus the cost of
building all improvements on the property,0 5 minus an adjustment
for the amount of depreciation that the improvements have
undergone since they were first installed.' 6 This approach is best
suited for properties such as proposed construction and specialty
properties not frequently exchanged in the market. 0 7 Apart
from these cases, it is still useful as a last resort if the other two
approaches are not applicable to the subject property.'0 8 Last, the
cost approach is the only major method that values land separately
from improvements, which is useful for many accounting and
insurance purposes.0 9
Despite these features, the cost approach is the most criticized of
the commonly used approaches to valuation."0 With respect to
residential properties, research has shown it to be significantly less
accurate than a sales comparison approach."' One key weakness of
103. See EATON, supra note 64, at 174-75.
104. For methods appraisers use to value land as if it were vacant, see APPRAISAL
INSTITUTE, supra note 86, at 331-47.
105. For methods appraisers use to value property improvements, see id. at 367-81.
106. For methods appraisers use to calculate depreciation, see id. at 383-414.
107. See id. at 354; Bradley R. Carter, Reviewing an Appraisal: An Attorney's Guide to
Preparingfor Battle, 25 REAL EST. L.J. 28, 38 (1996).
108. See APPRAISAL INSTITUTE, supra note 86, at 353-54 ('The cost approach is particularly
important when a lack of market activity limits the usefulness of the sales comparison
approach and when the properties to be appraised--e.g., single-family residences-are not
amenable to valuation by the income capitalization approach."); Hodges, supranote 84, at 558.
109. See APPRAISAL INSTITUTE, supra note 86, at 354-55.
110. See, e.g., Mark G. Dotzour & Mark R. Freitag, The Cost Approach in Residential
Appraising:Make It Optional, 63 APPRAISAL J. 182, 184 (1995) (finding that most users of
residential appraisals rarely find cost-based analyses helpful); Gregory A. Iwan, The Cost
Approach-Inflexible or Infeasible?, 61 APPRAISAL J. 136 (1993) (arguing that the cost
approach "seldom aids appraisers in arriving at proper, supportable valuation results").
111. See Mark G. Dotzour, An Empirical Analysis of the Reliability and Precision of the
Cost Approach in Residential Appraisal, 5 J. REAL EST. RES. 67, 72 (1990) ("On average, the
appraisal error from the cost approach was nearly 3.8% greater than the error from the sales
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this method is that it assumes that a replacement property would
be available instantly and thus does not take into account potential
construction delays. 112 Also, depreciation calculations become more
difficult as the property improvements increase in age, making the
cost approach difficult to apply to older buildings.1 13
Courts have also criticized the cost approach, often viewing it as
a last resort 14 and, occasionally, as irrelevant and prejudicial.11 5
Of course, when the other approaches are impossible or inadequate
and a value has to be reached-as it does, for example, in eminent
domain cases if there is no market in which to compare sale
prices-the cost approach is accepted reluctantly. 6
D. Appraisal Techniques and Judicial "Uniqueness"
Professional appraisal techniques do have difficulty in valuing a
few categories of properties. Specifically, appraisals are least
reliable when forced to rely solely upon the cost approach. 7 This
occurs when the data is not sufficient to support either the sales
1 Sales
comparison approach or the income capitalization approach."
comparisons fail when the real estate market in the surrounding

comparison approach on the same property.").
112. See APPRAISAL INSTITUTE, supra note 86, at 355.
113. See id. But see Dotzour, supra note 111, at 71 (finding no empirical correlation
between the age of residential homes and the relative accuracy or inaccuracy of the cost
approach).
114. See, e.g., Correia v. New Bedford Redev. Auth., 377 N.E.2d 909, 911 (Mass. 1978)
("Mhe introduction of evidence concerning value based on [depreciated reproduction cost]
computations has been limited to special situations in which data cannot be reliably computed
under the other two methods.").
115. One particularly insistent federal district judge put it this way:
No matter how carefully a judge attempts to instruct a jury ...
the impact of
direct testimony of dollars and cents of "reproduction cost less depreciation" will
tend to mislead a jury in fixing, as they should, what the willing buyer and the
willing seller would arrive at in the market place, and would divert them from
their consideration of comparable sales as to the best evidence of value.
United States v. 70.39 Acres of Land, 164 F. Supp. 451, 489 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
116. See EATON, supra note 64, at 228 ("Some jurisdictions have excluded cost approach
testimony unless it can be proven to the court's satisfaction that the property in dispute is a
special-purpose property.... One significant criterion of a special-purpose property is ...
the
lack of comparable sales data.").
117. See supra Part III.C.3.
118. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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area has not produced sufficient recent sales of similar properties." 9
Income capitalization fails either when the property is not incomeproducing or when the income produced or associated costs are so
unpredictable that they cannot provide a reliable base for value.12 °
As previously noted, the only logically pertinent reasons why land
contracts warrant a presumption of specific performance are the
difficulty in valuation due to land's inherent uniqueness and the
problems plaintiffs may have in finding substitute performance.1"2 '
These justifications correspond closely with the weaknesses in
professional appraisal practice. If a professional appraiser can find
no comparable sales for a property, it is because that property is
unique, and a plaintiff will almost certainly be unable to find
substitute performance.' 2 2 Investment properties that produce
wildly varying income streams are also probably quite unique, or at
least not readily replaceable.
Therefore, if the presumption in favor of specific performance of
land contracts was removed, the least unique properties would be
the easiest for appraisers to value, because the availability of
substitute performance necessarily means that there are comparable sales in the area that can be a good basis for a sales comparison
analysis. In such cases, the availability of comparable properties on
the market means that money damages can adequately compensate
the aggrieved party for that party's loss. For properties that are
more obviously unique, though, a court can avoid the difficulty in
ascertaining value through less reliable methods, like the cost
approach, by granting specific performance in its equitable capacity,
just as it would if the property was a unique or otherwise irreplaceable piece of personal property.12 3 In short, the equitable discretion
119. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
121. See supra Part II.B. For a discussion on the unavailability of substitute performance
as essentially redundant with the property's unique nature, see supranote 17.
122. It is true that comparable sales analysis depends on whether there were sales
conducted priorto the date of valuation, while the search for substitute performance takes
place after the court's determination of value. However, absent sudden, sweeping shifts in
local real estate markets, it would be difficult to find a case where a property that can be
suitably valued for trial via sales comparison analysis later has insufficient replacement
properties on the open market after the case has been litigated.
123. In this way, the general increased latitude that judges have gained in granting specific
relief, see supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text, saves the court and its professional
appraisal witnesses from struggling to value the most difficult properties. In fact, it is likely
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that courts utilize in all other specific performance cases is well-

suited to dealing with cases where the contract involves a transfer
of land.
V. TRANSACTION COSTS

One key drawback to removing the presumption that land
contracts always merit specific performance is that to do so would
add more appraisal issues into disputes, requiring parties to hire
valuation experts and potentially prolonging litigation.'24 This
concern is well-founded, but the harm would be less widespread
than one would initially expect. This is because in cases in which
value is uncertain, definitive appraisal is unnecessary. Appraisers
only need to present an opinion that valuation would be difficult, so
that the judge could decide in her equitable capacity that specific
performance is the proper remedy. With the judge functioning to
screen out the difficult cases, appraisers would be asked to fully
value only "easy" properties where the chances of widely varying
appraisals on either side are low. Thus, few contentious expert
"battles" would occur.
The judge's decision on this matter would weigh the same factors
that judges have been considering for centuries in nonland specific
performance cases. 125 It is true that parties to litigation would find
experts to make their argument on this point, however tenuous that
argument may be, but the increased regulation and certification of
real estate appraisers12 makes iteasier for a judge or jury to
distinguish qualified appraisal professionals from less scrupulous
expert witnesses. Furthermore, the judge's power to exclude any

that many of the judicial criticisms of professional real estate valuation, see supraPart III.B,
were shaped by cases similar to United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1942), in which the
property had to be valued, despite the lack of any reliable sales or income information, see id.
at 374-75.
124. See Shampton, supra note 78, at 114 (arguing that estimation by experts "usually
result[s] in a competing tattle of experts"').
125. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 (1981) (listing as significant
factors the difficulty in proving damages to a reasonable certainty, the difficulty in obtaining
substitute performance, and the likelihood that damage awards could be collected).
126. See supra notes 64-66.
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expert testimony that does not qualify as sufficiently scientific can
keep the discussion centered on established appraisal techniques. 2 7
There are also some offsetting factors. The consideration and
grant of specific performance, which would become less common in
a world without this presumption, consumes judicial resources.
Decrees requiring specific relief are more expensive than the
enforcement of a reward of money damages because the court
must monitor the losing party and make sure that the decreed
performance is carried out. 2 ' Also, as an equitable remedy, specific
performance is subject to a series of equitable defenses not available
in suits for contract damages.'29 The consideration and adjudication
of these concerns prolongs litigation and leads to increased costs.' 3 °
Removing the presumption in favor of specific relief in land
contracts would also remove these litigation and enforcement
concerns from a wide swath of cases.
CONCLUSION

The presumption in favor of specific performance in suits for
breach of real estate contracts has stood for centuries. However, it
has grown increasingly distant from its logical basis in recent
decades. Indeed, it proves inconsistent with itself by sometimes
granting specific relief to aggrieved sellers.' 3 ' It also proves
inconsistent with contract law by overcompensating aggrieved
parties" 2 and by taking into account and protecting the subjective
valuations of individual landowners."' Historically, these inconsistencies were well-founded in a logic of their own-land was very
difficult to value accurately, particularly due to the social status it
conferred." 4 The only justifications that stand up to a modern

127. See supra note 67.
128. See POSNER, supra note 10, at 132; Berkovich, supra note 6, at 355.
129. These defenses include adequacy of damages, uncertainty of terms, unfairness, public
policy, difficulty in enforcement, and the presence of a power of termination. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 359, 362, 364-366, 368 (1981).
130. See Berkovich, supra note 6, at 356.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
132. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 13, 46-56 and accompanying text.
134. See supra Part II.A.
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analysis are the difficulty in valuing land and the problem of finding
an adequate replacement.'3 5
The question then becomes whether these reasons are sufficient
to support the imposition of a blanket presumption in favor of
specific performance. To understand this question, however, it is
necessary to look at the alternative-what the state of the law
would be without the presumption. This Note has argued that the
removal of this presumption would be more fitting, largely because
of the dramatic improvements in real estate appraisal techniques.
Courts would determine land values via professional real estate
appraisal, and judges would retain their equitable discretion to
grant specific relief in those cases that merit such relief. Virtually
all cases in which the accurate valuation and reasonable
substitutability would be prohibitively difficult are cases where
specific relief would already be available under the basic rules of
contract law. In all other cases, real estate appraisal can divine
value with sufficient accuracy to protect the expectation interests of
the parties.
Jason S. Kirwan

135. See supra Part II.B.

